Rejected of application done under Section 119(2)(b) Application: Is It Appealable?

 

What is the remedy when the Income Tax Department refuses to condone the delay?

Tax laws prescribe deadlines for almost everything—filing a return, claiming a refund, submitting a particular form or making a claim for an exemption or deduction. But what happens when a genuine taxpayer misses the deadline?

Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 provides a valuable window for relief. It enables the competent income-tax authority, subject to the conditions prescribed, to admit an application or claim after the statutory time limit where doing so would help avoid “genuine hardship.”

But what if the application itself is rejected?

Can the taxpayer file an appeal before the CIT(A)? Can an appeal be filed before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT)? Or is there some other remedy?

The answer is important—and somewhat surprising.

What is Section 119(2)(b)?

Section 119(2)(b) is essentially a provision intended to provide relief from procedural time limits in appropriate cases. The provision empowers the CBDT, where it considers it desirable or expedient to avoid genuine hardship, to authorise an income-tax authority to admit an application or claim for an exemption, deduction, refund or other relief after the prescribed period and deal with it on merits.

In practical terms, it can come to the rescue where a taxpayer has a genuine claim but has lost the statutory opportunity because of delay.

For example, a taxpayer may have failed to file an income-tax return within the prescribed time and consequently could not claim a refund. In an appropriate case, an application under section 119(2)(b) may be made seeking condonation of the delay.

The provision has also been used in relation to delayed claims involving various forms, deductions, exemptions and refunds. CBDT itself has issued several circulars providing mechanisms for condonation of delay in specified circumstances.

But section 119(2)(b) is not a routine extension-of-time provision. The assessee has to establish genuine hardship and satisfy the applicable conditions.

The crucial question: Is rejection of Section 119(2)(b) appealable?

Generally, no.

An order passed by the Commissioner or other competent authority under section 119(2)(b) is regarded as an administrative order, rather than an appellate or assessment order.

Consequently, such an order does not find place among the orders against which an appeal can be filed before the ITAT under section 253 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

This issue was directly examined by the Gujarat High Court in CIT v. Rasida Ibrahimbhai Vohra [2014] 42 taxmann.com 85 (Guj.).

The Court held that an order passed by the Commissioner under section 119(2)(b) is an administrative order and that an appeal against such an order before the ITAT is not maintainable. The Court consequently set aside the Tribunal’s order where the ITAT had entertained such an appeal and directed the Commissioner to reconsider the matter.

Thus, merely because an assessee is aggrieved by rejection of a section 119(2)(b) application does not create a statutory right of appeal before the ITAT.

What about an appeal before CIT(A)?

The position is even clearer.

The appellate jurisdiction of the CIT(A) is conferred by the specific provisions relating to appeals. An order rejecting an application under section 119(2)(b) is not one of the prescribed appealable orders.

Therefore, the taxpayer cannot ordinarily convert a section 119(2)(b) rejection into an appeal before the CIT(A).

The important distinction is this:

Rejection of the section 119(2)(b) application is one thing; rejection of the substantive tax claim in an assessment or other appealable order is another.

For instance, if a taxpayer ultimately receives an assessment order denying a deduction, exemption or other claim, that assessment order may independently carry a right of appeal. But that does not make the earlier administrative order under section 119(2)(b) itself appealable.

The ITAT cannot exercise writ jurisdiction

This distinction becomes particularly important because the ITAT may otherwise appear to be the natural forum for a tax dispute.

However, the ITAT derives its jurisdiction from the statute. It cannot assume jurisdiction merely because the taxpayer has suffered an adverse order.

The Gujarat High Court in Rasida Ibrahimbhai Vohra made it clear that the Tribunal cannot exercise powers which properly belong to the High Court under its writ jurisdiction merely because the Tribunal considers the Commissioner’s decision deserving of reconsideration.

The principle has continued to be followed.

For example, the Chennai ITAT has recently reiterated that an order under section 119(2)(b) does not find mention among the orders appealable before the Tribunal under section 253 and, therefore, an appeal against such an order is not maintainable.

Thus, filing an ITAT appeal against rejection of a section 119(2)(b) application can result in the appeal being dismissed at the threshold itself.

Then what is the remedy?

If the rejection is legally unsustainable, the taxpayer’s principal remedy is generally to approach the jurisdictional High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution by way of a writ petition.

The High Court can examine whether the authority:

•  exercised the discretion vested in it properly;

•  considered the material facts and evidence;

•  applied the correct legal principles;

•  adopted a reasonable approach to “genuine hardship”;

•  passed a reasoned and speaking order;

•  ignored relevant evidence; or

•  acted arbitrarily or mechanically.

Importantly, a writ petition does not mean that every rejected section 119(2)(b) application will automatically be allowed.

The High Court exercises discretionary jurisdiction.

The taxpayer must establish a proper case for judicial interference.

Bombay High Court: A mechanical rejection can be interfered with

A useful recent example is Ravi Madhusudan Mehta & Ors. v. Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, decided by the Bombay High Court on 4 September 2024.

The case concerned rejection of applications under section 119(2)(b) seeking condonation of delay in filing income-tax returns.

The assessees had explained that their Chartered Accountant, upon whom they were dependent for their tax compliances, was unable to attend to professional work because of serious health problems in his family. Medical documents had also been produced.

The PCIT rejected the applications without properly explaining why the supporting material was not acceptable.

The Bombay High Court found the approach of the PCIT to be mechanical and observed that genuine human circumstances which prevent timely compliance require proper consideration. The Court ultimately quashed the rejection orders and directed that the returns be permitted to be filed.

This judgment demonstrates the practical importance of the writ remedy.

The High Court is not merely looking at whether there was a delay. It can examine whether the statutory discretion to deal with genuine hardship was exercised fairly and judiciously.

But “genuine hardship” is not a magic phrase

There is another side to the story.

An assessee cannot simply say, “There was a delay, therefore please condone it.”

Section 119(2)(b) does not provide an automatic right to condonation.

The Delhi High Court, in a judgment dated 23 December 2025 in Manjit Singh Dhaliwal v. Commissioner of Income Tax (International Taxation), considered a writ petition challenging rejection of an application under section 119(2)(b).

In that case, the Court upheld the rejection, noting that the authority had considered the assessee’s explanations and that the circumstances relied upon did not establish the required genuine hardship. The Court also reiterated that statutory time limits cannot ordinarily be relaxed merely because of inadvertence or negligence.

This provides an important balance.

Section 119(2)(b) is a remedial provision, but it is not a provision for routinely condoning every delay.

Therefore, the quality of the original application matters

This is perhaps the most important practical lesson.

A section 119(2)(b) application should not be drafted as a simple request saying:

“There was a genuine hardship. Kindly condone the delay.”

The application should establish the complete factual chain:

What was required to be done → what prevented compliance → why the reason was beyond the assessee’s reasonable control → when the difficulty came to an end → how quickly the assessee acted thereafter → what legitimate tax claim is involved → whether there is any loss of revenue → and why refusal would cause genuine hardship.

Documentary evidence should support the explanation wherever possible.

A carefully prepared application can also make a subsequent writ petition much stronger if the application is rejected without properly dealing with the facts.

One more important distinction

Suppose an assessee files an application under section 119(2)(b) for condonation of delay in filing a return.

The application is rejected.

The assessee cannot ordinarily appeal that rejection before the CIT(A) or ITAT.

But if, in an independent assessment proceeding, the Assessing Officer passes an order determining taxable income or rejecting a substantive claim, that subsequent order may have its own appellate remedy.

Therefore, practitioners must carefully identify which order is actually being challenged.

Confusing the administrative rejection under section 119(2)(b) with the substantive assessment order can lead to choosing the wrong appellate forum.

The changing tax law does not change the basic lesson

The new Income-tax Act, 2025 has reorganised and renumbered several provisions, including the framework dealing with condonation of delay. Therefore, for matters governed by the new Act, practitioners should verify the corresponding provision and applicable procedural framework rather than mechanically referring to section 119(2)(b) of the 1961 Act.

At the same time, for matters governed by the Income-tax Act, 1961, the judicial position discussed above remains directly relevant. The Income Tax Department itself continues to recognise section 119(2)(b) in relation to earlier assessment years and has issued orders concerning returns filed pursuant to condonation under that provision.

The takeaway

The legal position can be summarised quite simply:

Rejection of an application under section 119(2)(b) is generally not an appealable order before the CIT(A) or ITAT.

The reason is that the order is administrative in nature and does not fall within the statutory appellate jurisdiction.

Where the rejection is arbitrary, mechanical, legally erroneous, unsupported by reasons or passed without proper consideration of genuine hardship, the appropriate remedy may be to approach the jurisdictional High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

But a writ petition is not an automatic second appeal. The taxpayer must demonstrate why judicial interference is warranted.

Ultimately, section 119(2)(b) represents an important principle in tax administration: procedural deadlines are important, but the law itself recognises that genuine hardship can sometimes justify relief.

The real question, therefore, is not merely “Was the return or claim filed late?”

The more important question is:

“Why was it late, was the reason genuinely beyond the taxpayer’s control, was the claim otherwise legally admissible, and did the authority properly exercise the discretion entrusted to it by law?”

That is where the battle under section 119(2)(b) is actually fought.