

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO.12047 of 2025

**FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA**

and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PRANAV TRIVEDI

Approved for Reporting	Yes	No
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M/S TAPI READY PLAST
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.

Appearance:

MR SAURABH S RACHCHH(11364) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR. MAYUR V DHOTARE(7019) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MS SHRUNJAL SHAH ASSISTANT GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the
Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3

CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
and
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PRANAV TRIVEDI
Date : 27/11/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA)

1. Heard learned advocate Mr. Mayur Dhotare for the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. Shrunjal Shah for the respondents.
2. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. Shrunjal Shah waives service notice of rule on behalf of the respondents. With the consent of the respective parties, the matter is taken up for hearing today itself.
3. The present writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:-
"12 (A) Your Lordships may be pleased to admit and allow this petition;
(B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any

other appropriate writ, order a direction quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 23.04.2025 being No. / Naraave/Divison-8/Surat/GST/DRC-07/2205 of 2024-25 / 2025-26/ 296/ 74 passed by the respondent no. 2 - Appellate Authority as well as the Order-in-Original dated 28.02.2024 being Reference No. ZD240224060683L passed by the respondent no.3 -Authority. Copies of which are Annexure-"A" Colly to this petition, in the interest of justice;

In the alternative

Your Lordships may be pleased to condone the delay caused in preferring the statutory appeal before the respondent no. 2 - Appellate Authority and direct the said respondent no. 2 - Appellate Authority to hear the appeal on merits of the case, in the interest of justice."

3.1. Thus, the prayer clause suggest that there is an alternative prayer made by the petitioner to condone the delay caused in preferring the statutory appeal before respondent No.2 - Appellate Authority and further to direct the respondent authority to hear the appeal on merits.

4. The facts in brief are that a show cause notice dated 27.12.2023 under Section 73 of the Gujarat Goods and Services Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to the "GST Act") was issued for the Financial Year (FY) 2018-19 by the respondents calling upon explanation from the petitioner for not declaring of correct tax liability while filing the Annual Returns of GSTR-09. Further, it was alleged that tax on outward supply was under declaration by the petitioner which was revealed when reconciliation of the data was done with GSTR-09. The petitioner accordingly gave a reply on 10.02.2024 to respondent No.3.

4.1. Thereafter, respondent no. 3 passed an Order-in-Original dated 28.02.2024 under Section 73 of the GST Act. Being aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner preferred statutory appeal under Section 107 of the GST Act on 13.08.2024, belatedly i.e. beyond the period of limitation. The petitioner prayed for condoning the delay,



however, respondent No.2 passed the impugned order dated 23.04.2025 by rejecting the appeal on the ground of delay of 02 months and 16 days. Thus, the appeal preferred by the petitioner under the provisions of Section 107 of the GST Act was rejected by the Appellate Authority on the ground of delay.

5. At the outset, learned advocate Mr.Jay Dhotre for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of the High Court of Calcutta in the case of *S.K. Chakraborty & Sons. v. Union of India & Ors.*, (2023) 2 High Court Cases (Cal) 195 and has submitted that the delay in filing the appeal can be extended by the Appellate Authority and the appeal cannot be rejected on the basis that the Appellate Authority does not possess power to condone delay beyond 60 days. It is submitted that the High Court of Calcutta has invoked the provisions the Limitation Act, 1963 more particularly, Section 5 read with Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 for holding that the Appellate Authority has a discretion to condone the delay. However, it is fairly admitted by learned advocate Mr.Dhotre that in *Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.20272 of 2024* filed by the Revenue, the said decision has been stayed vide order dated 30.08.2024. Thus, it is urged that the impugned order may be quashed and set aside since the Appellate Authority has not appreciated the reason for filing appeal due to ill health of the accountant.

5.1. It is further submitted that due to closure of business all the partners have lost touch and they were unable to file the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation and the time was consumed for gathering necessary funds. Thus, it is submitted that the impugned order passed by the Appellate Authority may be quashed

and set aside.

6. *Per contra*, learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms.Shrunjal Shah appearing for the respondent has pointed out the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner of (CT) LTU, Kakinada & Ors. vs. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited (2020) 19 S.C.C. 681 and has submitted that the delay may not be condoned. It is submitted that in fact the Apex Court also held that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked by the Court for maintaining an appeal beyond maximum prescribed period in the Statute. Reliance is also placed by learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms.Shrunjal Shah on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of M/s.Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur, & Ors., rendered in Appeal (Civil) No.5949 of 2007 decided on 14.12.2007 and submitted that the ground raised in the appeal with regard to the closure of business is also not palatable. Hence, the Appellate Authority has precisely rejected the appeal.

7. We have heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and having perused the material on record, it transpires that the aforementioned facts about filing an appeal under the provisions of Section 107 of the GST Act, beyond the period of limitation of 2 months 16 days is not in dispute. Against the Order-in-Original dated 28.02.2024 passed under Section 73 of the GST Act, the petitioner preferred an appeal on 13.08.2024 which was beyond the period of limitation. The provisions of Section 107 under Chapter 18 of the GST Act stipulates filing of an appeal, which is as under :-

"Section 107. Appeals to Appellate Authority.-"

(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act or the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory

Goods and Services Tax Act by an adjudicating authority may appeal to such Appellate Authority as may be prescribed within three months from the date on which the said decision or order is communicated to such person.

(2) xxx xxx

(3) xxx xxx

(4) The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of three months or six months, as the case may be, allow it to be presented within a further period of one month."

8. Thus, the maximum period of presenting the appeal against the Order-in-Original was 3 months and thereafter, if the Appellate Authority is of the opinion that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause of presenting the appeal and the same can be allowed to be presented within further period of one month. Thus, the maximum period would be 120 days i.e. one month is only allowed if the Appellate Authority is satisfied that the appellant was presented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within a period of three months. Thus, at the first instant, the petitioner was required to file an appeal within a period of three months, and only if the Appellate Authority gets satisfied that the cause shown by the petitioner for non-filing of the appeal within a period of three months; the Appellate Authority has the power to give one month more to present the same.

8.1. In the present case, the petitioner has filed appeal after a period of 2 months 16 days which is over and above the aforesaid period. Thus, even if the Appellate Authority in its discretion had accepted the cause shown by the petitioner for belatedly filing the appeal, the Appellate Authority had the power to condone the delay for a period of one month and allow such appeal to be filed within period of limitation of one month only. Thus, the Appellate Authority has precisely held that it does not have the power to condone the

delay in filing the appeal beyond the period of limitation of 120 days.

9. However, the issue which calls for deliberation as to whether this Court can set aside the order of the Appellate Authority and further direct the Appellate Authority to accept the appeal beyond the condonation period or not?

10. At this stage, we may refer to the observations of the Apex Court in the case of ***Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited (supra)***. The Apex Court while examining the issue analogs to the issue of Sales Tax and VAT, Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 and provisions of Section 31 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provides power of Appellate Authority to condone the delay and power of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has held that the Appellate Authority has no power to condone the delay, if an appeal is preferred after the aggregate period. However, it is held that though the powers of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are wide, but certainly not wider than the plenary powers bestowed on the Apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. It is held as under :-

“16. Indubitably, the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution are wide, but certainly not wider than the plenary powers bestowed on this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. Article 142 is a conglomeration and repository of the entire judicial powers under the Constitution, to do complete justice to the parties. Even while exercising that power, this Court is required to bear in mind the legislative intent and not to render the statutory provision otiose. In a recent decision of a three Judge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited vs. Gujarat Energy Transmission Corporation Limited & Ors., the statutory appeal filed before this Court was barred by 71 days and the maximum time limit for condoning the delay in terms of Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 was only 60 days. In other words, the appeal was presented beyond the condonable period of 60 days. As a result,

*this Court could not have condoned the delay of 71 days. Notably, while admitting the appeal, the Court had condoned the delay in filing the appeal. However, at the final hearing of the appeal, an objection regarding appeal being barred by limitation was allowed to be raised being a jurisdictional issue and while dealing with the said objection, the Court referred to the decisions in *Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur & Ors.*, *Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise vs. Hongo India Private Limited & Anr.*, *Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission & Ors.* and *Suryachakra Power Corporation Limited vs. Electricity Department* represented by its Superintending Engineer, Port Blair & Ors. and concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked by the Court for maintaining an appeal beyond maximum prescribed period in Section 125 of the Electricity Act.”*

11. Thus, the Apex Court in the case of ***Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited (supra)*** has cautioned that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be invoked by the Court (High Court) for maintaining an appeal beyond the maximum period provided in Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2023, it has held as under :-

*“15..... In the subsequent decision in *Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India*, this Court went to observe that an Act cannot bar and curtail remedy under Article 226 or 32 of the Constitution. The Court, however added a word of caution and expounded that the Constitutional Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise its jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment. To put it differently, the fact that the High Court has wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution does not mean that it can disregard the substantive provisions of a statute and pass orders which can be settled only through a mechanism prescribed by the statute.”*

12. The Apex Court has also referred to the array of decisions dealing with provisions of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in case of Special Legislation. One of such which has been rendered in the said decision is in the case of ONGC vs. Gujarat Energy

Transmission Corpn. Ltd. (2017) 5 S.C.C. 42, wherein it is held thus :-

"15. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear as crystal that the Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, has ruled that there is no conflict of opinion in Antulay case [A.R.Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602] or in Union Carbide Corpn. case [Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584] with the principle set down in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996. Be it noted, when there is a statutory command by the legislation as regards limitation and there is the postulate that delay can be condoned for a further period not exceeding sixty days, needless to say, it is based on certain underlined, fundamental, general issues of public policy as has been held in Union Carbide Corpn. case [Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India, (1991) 4 SCC 584]. As the pronouncement in Chhattisgarh SEB v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, (2010) 5 SCC 23, lays down quite clearly that the policy behind the Act emphasising on the constitution of a special adjudicatory forum, is meant to expeditiously decide the grievances of a person who may be aggrieved by an order of the adjudicatory officer or by an appropriate Commission. The Act is a special legislation within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the prescription with regard to the limitation has to be the binding effect and the same has to be followed regard being had to its mandatory nature. To put it in a different way, the prescription of limitation in a case of present nature, when the statute commands that this Court may condone the further delay not beyond 60 days, it would come within the ambit and sweep of the provisions and policy of legislation. It is equivalent to Section 3 of the Limitation Act. Therefore, it is uncondonable and it cannot be condoned taking recourse to Article 142 of the Constitution."

13. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further held in the case of ***Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited (supra)*** as under :-

"19. We may now revert to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. (supra), which had adopted the view taken by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Panoli Intermediate (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors.19 and also of the Karnataka High Court in Phoenix Plasts Company vs. Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeal), Bangalore 20. The logic applied in these decisions



proceeds on fallacious premise. For, these decisions are premised on the logic that provision such as Section 31 of the 1995 Act, cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. This approach is faulty. It is not a matter of taking away the jurisdiction of the High Court. In a given case, the assessee may approach the High Court before the statutory period of appeal expires to challenge the assessment order by way of writ petition 19 AIR 2015 Guj 97 20 2013 (298) ELT 481 (Kar.) 33 on the ground that the same is without jurisdiction or passed in excess of jurisdiction by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction including in flagrant disregard of law and rules of procedure or in violation of principles of natural justice, where no procedure is specified. The High Court may accede to such a challenge and can also nonsuit the petitioner on the ground that alternative efficacious remedy is available and that be invoked by the writ petitioner. However, if the writ petitioner chooses to approach the High Court after expiry of the maximum limitation period of 60 days prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act, the High Court cannot disregard the statutory period for redressal of the grievance and entertain the writ petition of such a party as a matter of course. Doing so would be in the teeth of the principle underlying the dictum of a three Judge Bench of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (supra). In other words, the fact that the High Court has wide powers, does not mean that it would issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding the dispensation explicitly prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act. That would render the legislative scheme and intention behind the stated provision otiose.

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22. Suffice it to observe that this decision is on the facts of that case and cannot be cited as a precedent in support of an argument that the High Court is free to entertain the writ petition assailing the assessment order even if filed beyond the statutory period of maximum 60 days in filing appeal. The remedy of appeal is creature of statute. If the appeal is presented by the assessee beyond the extended statutory limitation period of 60 days in terms of Section 31 of the 2005 Act and is, therefore, not entertained, it is incomprehensible as to how it would become a case of violation of fundamental right, much less statutory or legal right as such."

14. Thus, the Apex Court has held that even if the writ petition is filed after the expiry of maximum prescribed period of limitation,

though alternative efficacious remedy is available, the High Court cannot disregard the statutory period for redressal of the grievance and entertain the writ petition of such a party as a matter of course and doing so would be in teeth of principle of dictum underlying the dictum of three Judge's Bench of the Apex Court in case of **ONGC (supra)**. The Apex Court has further held that, albeit, the High Court has wide powers, but the same does not mean that it would issue a writ which may be inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding the dispensation explicitly prescribed under Section 31 of the Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005 and if the same is done, it would render the legislative scheme and intention behind the stated provision otiose. Thus, on the same principles as enunciated by the Apex Court, we are not inclined to set aside the order passed by the Appellate Authority and more particularly in wake of the lame excuse given by the petitioner for condoning the delay such as the illness of the Accountant and closure of business.

15. We may also refer to the observations of the Apex Court in the case **M/s. Singh Enterprise (supra)** wherein the Apex Court on the same line has refused to accept the reason of belatedly filing of the appeal on the pretext of lack of experience and closure of business.

16. Thus the writ petition stands dismissed. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.

(A. S. SUPEHIA, J)

(PRANAV TRIVEDI, J)

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